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In the old days trustees of colleges and universities knew what 
was expecLed of them and, more importantly, what they expected ot 
themselves. It was their duty to aLffi at the good of the institution of 
which they were the trustees, and their view of that good was 
determinate. Though they exercised their power indirectly through a 
pres~dent, he was their agent and held office subject to their favor. 
Though they might choose to accept the recommendations of others --
alumni or faculty that too was a matter ot cho~ce. Neither they nor 
anyone else doubted that, within the limits of the statutes governing 
trusteeship, they were the ultimate authority. 
All that is now changing, and rather rapidly. The acrimonious 
disagreement over investment in South Africa -- a disagreement that may 
be in remission from time to time but is far from being resolved -- is 
bUL one s~gn, if a striking one, of the collapse of the old consensus 
on the role of a trustee. For, if some of those addressing the 
trustees abouL investment policy st~11 only offer suggestions, others 
are issuing injunctions. If some agree with trustees that theirs is 
the decision, ana so seek only to persuade, others challenge the 
trustees' right to decide. Trustees, these critics hold, are not 
definers of the institution's good; they are merely the instruments by 
which the public's view of that good is carried out. What is more, 
trustees have become increasingly uncertain of their role and so are 
more and more disposed to adopt the role that their critics wish to 
assign them. 
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It is interesting to speculate about why the role of trustee is 
changing in this way, and the first thing to see is that it is far from 
being a un1que phenomenon: the abrogation 01 their authority by former 
authorities is a pervasive feature of contemporary culture. Authority 
figures -- whether policemen, parents, teachers, physicians or 
psychiatrists -- have taken cover in a variety of disguises. Parents 
become friends of their children; psychiatrists have converted 
themselves into facilitators at consciousness-raising sessions; 
lecturers have descended from the podium to participate in student 
discussions that are not distinguishable from what used to be called 
bull sessions. 
One ot the most important changes of this kind has occurred in 
the roles of legislators and congressmen -- a change from what we may 
call a Burkeian to a Rousseauean conception ot these roles. 
Legislators and congressmen have always wanted to be reelected and have 
always known that in order to be reelected they must please -- or at 
least not seriously displease the electorate. In the old days 
however, between elect10ns they were to some extent on their own; be1ng 
on a relatively long leash -- the two- or six-year interval between 
elect10ns -- it was up to them to decide how to vote, it that was only 
a matter of deciding how they thought the electorate wanted them to 
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vote. And ignorant as they often knew themselves to be of what the 
electorate "really" wanted, they sometimes voted in accordance w1th 
what they thought was to the best interest of their district, or even, 
possibly of the country as a whole. They were accountable to the 
electorate only for their voting record as a whole and only at the next 
elect10n. In a word, judgment and responsibil1ty were major elements 
in the Burkeian legislator. In the Rousseauean concept, in contrast, 
the legislator is kept on a very short leash. He is not responsible 
for deciding how to vote but only for voting in accordance with the 
preterences of his constituency. Since he is expected to ascertain 
those preferences regarding each piece of proposed legislation there is 
no occasion for him to exercise his own judgment, good or bad, and 
since he makes no decisions, he is not accountable, or rather he is 
accountable only as agent, not as principal. 
In the late eighteenth century when Burke and Rousseau were 
writ1ng, the legislator had perforce to be a Burkeian: in the 
intervals between elections he had to use his best judgment; only at 
elect10ns was the electorate's will accessible to him. The Rousseauean 
legislator, as Rousseau himself recognized, was feasible only in the 
tiny state which he advocated in his Social Contract. It is the recent 
emergence of the science (so-called) of public opinion research that 
has for tne first t1me made the Rousseauean pol1t1cian a real 
possibility, and it must be said that politicians have made haste to 
convert themselves from the Burkeian to the Rousseauean model. By 
having polls made before every major bill comes up for a vote the 
Rousseauean legislator can ascertain -- or, more exactly, can believe 
h~mself to have ascertained the will of the electorate regarding 
that piece of legislation. He is thus relieved from the need of 
deciding, from the risk of making a mistake. He w~llingly abdicates 
authority to any "experts" who will tell him what the will of the 
people is. Pure democracy is achieved to everybody's satisfact~on 
so long as everybody has confidence in the results of public opinion 
research. But note that, as a result of these changes, the good 
legislator today, in contrast to the good legislator of the past, is 
one who is instantly responsive to the electorate, not one who is 
responsible for the electorate. 
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It is fascinating to see analogous changes occurring in other 
fields, for instance -- to shift from the far from sublime to the not 
far from ridiculous -- in the film industry. In the old days some 
Hollywood producers may have wanted to make artistic films; they all 
certainly wanted to make money. If they predicted publ~c taste 
correctly they became immensely rich and perhaps had the additional 
satisfact~on ot hav~ng made good films -- just as Burkeian legislators 
not only got themselves reelected but may have acquired a reputation 
for statesmanship as well. If Hollywood producers misjudged public 
taste they were ruined, but while they survived they were czars. They 
made tne decisions, and their decisions were final. Now, it a recent 
film called "Private Schools" is representative, producers are becoming 
mere agents who implement the decisions of their public opinion 
research staff. l This film was not produced; it was assembled: a 
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number of separate episodes were shot and then tested for the reactions 
of a "target audience of less discriminating 15- and 16-year-old kids," 
as the producer described the procedure. If the teenage audiences 
l~ked an episode (their reactions were watched through two-way mirrors) 
the episode was expanded and might eventually be hung on the flexible 
story l~ne that was used as a substitute for a plot; if reactions to an 
episode were lukewarm it was dropped and another episode was inserted. 
The film, which we are told will make a great deal of money, thus has 
as little inner coherence as the voting record of a Rousseauean 
legislator, whose votes retlect not his own system of values but the 
shifting recommendations of his pollsters. 
Th~s transfer ot authority away from old authorities who, for 
better or worse, were generally accepted as authorities to a diffuse 
ana indeterminate public has been going on a long time; it is part of 
the very massive and complex process which can be characterized as the 
democratizat~on ot culture. That this should happen is not necessarily 
a good thing nor yet a bad thing; we cannot yet tell. But it is 
certainly a new thing, which makes it automatically good in the v~ew of 
some and bad in the view of others. This change was enormously speeded 
up by events or the Sixties, especially the Vietnam war. Hosti!~ty to 
the war was so great and so widespread that devices regularly used by 
congress ana president to delay and deflect to control -- public 
opinion were ineffective. Authority, at least on this issue, passed 
out ot their hands. 
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And not only on this issue: a new pattern had been established 
in which congress and the president were more responsive, and more 
immediately responsive, to what they took to be public opinion than 
ever before. That a new set ot expectations emerged as a result of the 
Vietnam experience should not be surprising. There is a close relation 
between behav~oral habits and social expectations, and between the 
latter and our evaluations of conduct -- our judgments that duties have 
been well done or that dut~es have been left undone. Thus, other 
things being equal, if A does ~ on one occasion, people expect him (and 
he expects himself) to do ~ on similar occasions. Over t~me, what is 
expected comes to be experienced as obligatory: if A does ~ often 
enough on such-and-such occasions other people are l~kely to come to 
believe that it is his duty to do ~, and he himself will feel it would 
be wrong not to do it. 
So much by way of background to the trustee case. Trustees do 
not live insulated lives; they are exposed to much the same influences 
and the same sets ot expectations as are other people. Indeed, they 
~ other people -- in the sense that most of them are also directors 
of corporations or CEOs; some doubtlessly are legislators; some, even, 
are film producers. And the changed practices that they observe and 
directly experience in their own behavior in the realm of business or 
politics naturally affect their expectations for themselves as 
trustees. Moreover, though few trustees, save those of public 
institutions, have to get themselves reelected, they are all becoming 
increasingly dependent on their public (e.g., alumni) for financial 
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support and so feel that they must be responsive to the will of that 
publ~c. And, over t~me, a practice that init~ally had a merely 
pragmatic imperative -- if we aren't responsive annual giving will 
decline -- Will become, in accordance with the tendency just described, 
a moral imperative -- it will be a trustee's duty to be responsive; it 
Will be wrong to cla~m responsibil~ty. 
In this process student protest against investment in companies 
doing business in South Africa has seen a major factor. If public 
react~on against the Vietnam war hastened the transformation ot 
Burkeian legislators into Rousseauean legislators, the agitation in the 
late sevent~es and early eighties against the investment pol~cy of most 
Boards is hastening the transformation, which now seems well under way, 
of trustees from responsible owners to responsive agents. For though 
in the past here and there a board has had to yield on this or that 
issue to aroused local opinion, the host~l~ty to investment in South 
Africa was widespread, intense and sustained -- the most sustained 
attack s~nce the agitation a decade earl~er for Black Studies. Hav~ng 
yielded to that earlier attack, trustees found yielding on this one 
easier. A habit of responsiveness is thus be~ng established. 
The agitation against investment in South Africa is so central 
in tne trustee case, and so typical of the more general process we have 
been describing, that it will repay us to look a bit more closely at 
the way student indignation over investment policy is changing 
trustees' view of their role. 2 For, as we shall see, student 
object~ons to investment in companies doing business in South Africa is 
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not only changing trustees' investment policy; it is changing trustees' 
concept Lon ot how they have to behave in order to be good trustees. 
Before the student agitation began trustees believed they ought 
to maximize the return on the university's portfolio within the 
limitations of the prudent man rule. That, as they saw it, was their 
whole duty as trustee investors, and many of them held that their whole 
duty, or at least their chief duty, as trustees was their duty as 
investors. Thus for trustees their duty as trustees did not differ 
greatly from their duty as, say, directors of corporations to make 
maximize profits for the stockholders, but again within lLmitations ot 
the prudent man rule. In both areas they had an obligation to be 
responsible investors: they must not risk the corpus of the portfolio 
-- alternatively, the integrity of the corporation -- by speculative 
investments, as they could, if they chose, risk their own portfolios in 
the pursuit of greater return. 
In a word, trustees tended to assimilate the management of an 
educational institution to that of a business enterprise, failing to 
notice that the goal of an educational institution is different from 
the goal of a business enterprise. For instance, an educational 
insti~utLon aims to produce a change for the better (however vaguely 
"better" may be defined) in those who pass through it. A business 
enterprise is concerned only indirectly with how insiders are changed 
by that enterprise, and then only so far as these changes affect the 
enterprise's relations with outsiders. 
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Few trustees had occasion to notice this difference in goals 
until students began protest1ng over investments in South Africa on the 
grounds that it was wrong to give aid and comfort to a morally 
repugnant regime. And it must have shaken trustees' confidence in 
themselves as responsible owners to find students bringing to their 
attention a difference they had not noticed, but which, once noticed, 
most of them recognized to be real and important. 
But how much of a difference was it? About this there was no 
consensus. The prudent man rule had provided trustees with a guideline 
for dist1nguishing between permissible and impermissible investments. 
Now that they recognized that the prudent man rule must somehow be 
qual1fied by moral considerations, they needed a new guidel1ne. 
Everybody -- except the most left-wing of students -- agreed, 
and agrees, that investment in the so-called American free enterprise 
system is appropriate. Everybody agrees that investment in bordellos 
or in the Mafia are inappropriate, no matter how large the total return 
may be. Most people agree that it would be appropriate (though it 
might not be prudent) to invest in the UK, even though racial prejudice 
exists there. Many people agree that it is appropriate to invest in 
Ch11e and Argentina, even though many Americans dislike the record ot 
those countries on civil liberties. 
On which side of the line distinguishing permissible from 
impermissible investments does South Africa fall? Is it more like the 
UK (as many trustees are inclined to think) or more l1ke the Mafia (as 
students assert)? Without clear guidelines from courts or from public 
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opinion, these are not easy questions to answer. This explains the 
attract~on to many trustees of the Sullivan formula. 3 It appeals to 
trustees less perhaps because they view it as "reasonablefl than because 
they hope that public opinion will come to accept it as a replacement 
for the prudent-man rule. These trustees are less concerned with the 
content ot the rule than that there be an agreed-on rule, thereby 
removing investment policy from the zone of uncertainty into which 
student objections have cast it. 
This shift in investment policy -- and from the point of v~ew 
of trustees it is a very big shift -- was pretty much completed by the 
early eighties. But it is unlikely that it will settle the issue 
between trustees and their student public. In the first place, there 
is by no means agreement that the Sullivan formula is "adequate." In 
the second place, behind disagreements about whether investment in this 
or tnat particular company is acceptable, there is a much larger 
question: is it the duty of trustees merely to listen to students for 
advice on moral matters (as they listen to their investment counsel for 
advice on financial matters), and then, as the responsible parties, to 
decide? Or is it their duty to be responsive to the w~ll of their 
student public? Few if any trustees have yet become sufficiently 
Rousseauean to go that far, and most doubtlessly hope that their publ~c 
will be ind~fferent or at least quiescent on other investment issues. 
Nevertheless a precedent has been established -- the precedent not only 
of listening to the student advice but of responding to student 
opinion. And precedents, it should be noted, have a certain weight, 
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that is, expectations closely track behavior. 
Investment policy was not the only issue between trustees and 
students. It was not only a question of what stocks to sell, but of 
how to dispose of those that were to be sold. In pre-South African 
days, when the investment committee of a board decided, for whatever 
reason, to elLminate some holding from its portfolio, it simply 
instructed its brokers to sell; that was the end of it. That would not 
be the end of it if trustees were to be responsive to student opinion. 
Student opinion not only wanted the sales to be made; it wanted, and 
st~ll wants, them made with fanfares and trumpets. It wants maximum 
publicity for the sales because it wants to use them to influence 
pol~cy -- the policy of U.S. corporations and of the U.S. government 
and, ultimately, the policy of the South African regime. 
It would miss the students' point to argue that the holdings ot 
American educational institutions are too small for sales to have an 
effect. Student opinion is proposing that education institutions as 
represented by their boards of trustees become lobbies -- whether 
successful or unsuccessful lobbies is beside the point. Th~s would be, 
from trustees' points of view, a very large change in their role. It 
is not the case of course that boards of trustees never lobby. On the 
contrary, boards are expected to lobby on matters directly affecting 
their institutions. Boards that did not lobby against legislation that 
would abolish the deduction for charitable giving would be accused 
ana rightly accused -- of neglecting their duty. But the students call 
for an institution's trustees to lobby in a matter that does not affect 
that institution directly, and does not even affect it indirectly, 
except in the way and to the extent that it affects all people 
everywhere. 
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Trustees, as we have seen, like to have l~nes drawn that prov~de 
guidance and so define their responsibility. They are bound to ask 
where, if they lobby against South African racial pol~cy, they are to 
draw the line that defines permissible lobbying from impermissible, or 
imprudent, lobbying. If they have a duty to lobby against South Africa 
have they also a duty to lobby against Chile and Argentina? against 
nuclear power? against increases in the defense budget? The w~der the 
domain in which lobbying is expected of trustees (i.e., is regarded as 
a duty), the more l~kely they are to expose their institution to 
retaliation from those who favor the policies that the trustees have 
lobbied against. 
Again, trustees are l~kely to want to calculate the costs and 
benefits to their institution of this and other proposed modification 
of their role, and in making these calculations they are l~kely to take 
seriously the risk to their institution attendant on their descending 
from the ivory tower and tiptoeing into the political arena. Trustees 
take this risk seriously because, once again, if something goes wrong, 
it is they who will be blamed. Students, who are not responsible if 
something goes wrong, are likely to weigh the risk as low, if they 
weigh it at all. But the chief issue between trustees and students is 
not a difference in the outcome of two calculations; it is a difference 
of opinion as to whether calculation is appropriate in this kind of 
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situation. 
In the V1ew of trustees brought up in the Burkeian mold it is 
their duty, as it is the duty of legislators brought up in the Burkeian 
mold -- if indeed any survive to calculate as best they can, about 
all matters that come before them for decision: That, to them, is what 
doing the best they can for their institution means. From their point 
of view, the proposal to expand their role as trustee to include 
lobbying against corporations doing business in South Africa merely 
introduces a new and difficult-to-measure item into their calculations. 
Since trustees are on the whole risk-averse and since they can have 
little confidence in the results of this calculation, they are likely 
to resist the proposal. 
To students this whole approach is fundamentally wrong-headed. 
To them calculation with respect to a moral issue -- especially one in 
which one s1de is so very black and the other so very white -- is not 
only unnecessary; it is indecent and evasive. A sign of their moral 
indignation is their preference for the term "divest" to describe what 
they want trustees to do. "Sell" is an ordinary, everyday, run-of-the-
mill word; "divest" is a very high class word, w1th connotations of 
cleansing, purifying, and laying bare. Divest! divest! has much the 
tonal qua11ty of repent! repent! In both cases the kingdom of heaven 
is just around the corner, its coming only delayed by the intransigence 
of a handful of stubborn sinners. 
Though students certainly hope that an educational lobby w11l 
have a salutary effect on corporations, they also believe that 
14 
publicized sale of the corporations' stock will have a salutary effect 
on the sellers; it will be l~ke public confession, good for the 
institutional soul. In a word, disposing of the stock is prized by 
them more as a symbolic gesture than as a l~kely cause of a change in 
the behavior of U.S. corporations, and possibly of the South African 
government as well. 
But since gestures lose some of their value as symbols if the 
gesturer gains by making them, a gesture is especially valuable when 
one loses by making it. Then and only then can those to whom it is 
addressed be sure that the gesturer's heart is pure. Hence students 
are untouched by the argument sometimes put forward, that selling the 
stock would cause a decline in the return on the portfolio. Trustees 
would regard a decline as a serious matter if they really believed (as 
they almost certainly do not) that losses would be likely. But 
students want the portfolio to suffer -- not too much, of course, and 
doubtless not in ways that would affect them personally! No wonder, 
then, that a meeting of minds is difficult. 
If the shift from the Burkeian pattern for trustees to the 
Rousseauean pattern were complete -- or if, of course, it had never 
begun -- such disagreements as those we have been discussing would not 
occur, for trustees' expectations for themselves -- their view of their 
duty as trustees -- and students' expectations for them would be 
identical. But as it is, trustees' expectations for themselves lag 
behind students' expectations for them, many trustees still regard 
themselves as ultimately responsible for the institution of which they 
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are trustees, and most students regarding them as no more as a conduit 
along which the will of their public flows. 
Bow should trustees act in this period of transition? Should 
they encourage the changes we have been describing, or should tney 
oppose them? They face a moral problem which, it may comfort them to 
real1ze, is not unique. Moral problems arise when, for whatever 
reason, society no longer has a unanimous expectation regarding 
performance in some social role. As long as there is general agreement 
as to how parents ought to treat their children (spare the rod and 
spoil the child), how the young should behave towards their elders (be 
seen and not heard), how soldiers should conduct themselves in battle 
(do and die), parents, the young and soldiers know what they ought to 
do. They may of course not always do what they ought to, but that is a 
matter ot wnat is sometimes called "weakness of will," not of cognit1ve 
uncertainty regarding what is the right act in these circumstances. 
Because we are 11ving in a period of very rapid social change 
almost all roles -- not merely those involving authority relationships 
-- are under pressure to adjust. Pertormers in these roles no longer 
know what they ought to do. They have a cognitive problem: the 
problem of deciding how to act as their circumstances change. They are 
bound to ask themselves whether the changes in their environment are 
the wave of the future or only an ephemeral ripple. No one wants to be 
a King Canute resisting a wave; no one wants to retreat from what turns 
out to be a mere ripple. 
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If the changes in ethos we have described prove to be a ripple 
-- if something like the Burkeian pattern is revived -- trustees and 
other authority figures will once again know what they ought to do. If 
the process continues their problem w111 also be solved, but in a 
d1fferent way -- they will be out of business. For the logical 
terminus ot the democratization of culture now underway is the 
elimination of intermediary authorities -- for instance, the conversion 
of representative democracy into plebiscitary democracy, in which the 
legislative link between voter and executive is no longer needed 
because every citizen is able to record his momentary preference by 
pushing the yes button or the no button on his TV set after listening 
to tne president's report on the State of the Union. So for trustees: 
the logical terminus would be their elimination as redundant. Trustees 
have already moved a long way from the days in which they themselves 
found the money out of their own pockets to balance the university's 
budget. Now, increasingly, they depend on other sources for financial 
support and so have become responsive to the public those sources 
represent. The end result would be their replacement by those even 
more responsive individuals known as development officers. Boards 
could tnen disappear leaving not a rack behind them. 
But that is as yet only a possible future. In this period of 
transit10n, what should trustees do? If they could e1ther see into the 
future or else wait for the long run, they could always be assured of 
d01ng the right tning. But nobody can look into the future, and in the 
long run even trustees are dead. That being the case, trustees can 
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only try to be sensitive -- but not too sensitive -- to whatever 
changes in their environment their public brings to their attention, 
knowing that the best anyone can do at any time is to do the best that 
one can do at that t~me. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. "The Private Diary of a Movie" in Los .Angeles Times Calendar, 
July 31, 1983, pp. 1-8. 
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2. I shall use the term "student" as a convenient shorthand to refer 
to the whole group of critics, of which students probably form the 
majority but which also includes many faculty members and some 
trustees. After all, some of the flower children of the sixties 
are now professors or even trustees, hav1ng undergone a partial, if 
not complete, transformation. Similarly, the term "trustee" refers 
to all those who, whether actually trustees or not, resist the 
critics' recommendations. 
3. The Sullivan formula, so-called because it was worked up by the 
Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, a director of General Motors, consists of a 
set 0:1: six "principles" that define equal employment practices for 
U.S. companies doing business in South Africa. More than a hundred 
f1rms have accepted these principles and agreed to report regularly 
on their progress in putting them into effect. 
